



When long-distance relationships don’t work out: 




We assess the impact of party representation on satisfaction with democracy. Our proposition is 
that such representation is not only about having a chosen party in government; citizens also 
derive satisfaction from having their views represented by a political party. We test this through 
an individual-level measure of policy (in)congruence: the ideological distance between a voter 
and his or her closest party. Via multi-level modelling of European Election Study data from 
1989-2009, we find that perceived policy distance matters: the further away that voters see 
themselves from their nearest party – on either a left-right or a European unification policy 
dimension – the less satisfied they are with democracy. Notably, this effect is not moderated by 
party incumbency or size. Voters derive satisfaction from feeling represented by a nearby party 
even if it is small and out of office. Our results caution against a purely outcomes-driven 
understanding of democratic satisfaction. 
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This is not a golden age for electoral democracy in Europe. Turnout has long been declining in 
most countries, party identification likewise, established party systems have been breaking 
down, and the recent populist surge seemed to expose a worrying disconnect between elites 
and electors. When Schmitter and Trechsel asserted that “one of the most striking features of 
European democracies is an apparently widespread feeling of political discontent, disaffection, 
scepticism, dissatisfaction and cynicism among citizens” (2004, p. 15), they can be accused of 
exaggeration but not fabrication. Admittedly, there is debate about just how new is this 
discontent, and whether the current situation constitutes a ‘crisis’ (van de Walle et al., 2008; 
Norris, 2011). But this should not obscure the key point which is that, across Europe, the 
competition between the major parties at election time leaves a large (and probably a growing) 
proportion of citizens unimpressed.  
In this article, we examine one possible source of such disillusionment: the 
(un)representativeness of European party systems. Our argument is that citizens derive 
satisfaction from having a party that represents their views – regardless of whether that party 
gains office. Conversely, those voters feeling that no party out there shares their preferences 
are liable to feel let down by electoral politics. There is an analogy here with social or 
descriptive representation (Heath, 2015), which bonded citizens to the political system by 
making them feel that there was a party catering for the interests of ‘people like them’. 
Ideological or policy representation has the potential to do the same, making people feel that 
views like theirs are given expression at election time. Essentially we propose that voters care 
not just about what they get out of government, but also about having their views represented 
– between elections as well as at them. 
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While there is no shortage of prior research seeking to predict, explain and understand 
satisfaction with democracy (see, inter numerous alia, Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Blais and 
Gélineau, 2007; Lühiste, 2013), relatively little of this has focused on aspects of representation. 
A first important exception is Myunghee Kim’s (2009) study showing that ‘incongruence’ – 
defined as the distance between a voter’s ideological position and the position of the median 
party in parliament – generates dissatisfaction with democracy. This provides a useful 
departure point for our own work but we move beyond it, conceptually as well as empirically. 
The conceptual shift is to allow voters’ policy preferences to be represented by parties as well 
as by parliaments or governments. Following from this, the empirical shift is to examine 
whether satisfaction is driven by a different measure of incongruence, namely the ideological 
distance between a voter and his or her closest party. Using European Election Study (EES) data 
from 1989-2009 (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2014; Author et al, 2013), we show that it is. Citizens 
perceiving a party – even a relatively minor player in the system – as closer to them, whether 
on a left-right ideological or a European unification issue scale, were more satisfied with 
democracy in their member state. In short, parties matter. Individual parties matter to 
individuals, and the representativeness of the party system matters to electorates. In the next 
two sections, we explain why that is, before presenting the data and measures, the results and 
our conclusions about the representation-satisfaction nexus. 
2. How parties represent voters 
This article is about representation. More specifically, it is in that subfield of research assessing 
how far parties or governments manage to represent or respond to citizens’ policy preferences. 
Prior research in this field has been concerned with one citizen in particular: the median voter 
(Blais and Bodet, 2006; Huber and Powell, 1994; Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011; Kang and Powell, 
2010). When asking whether governments enact the popular will, and how far institutional 
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arrangements encourage them to do so, researchers have interpreted the popular will as 
represented by that median voter. As Matt Golder and Jacek Stramski summarise, ‘the 
predominant way to conceptualize and measure citizen–representative congruence is in terms 
of the absolute ideological distance between the median citizen and the government’ (2010, p. 
90, emphasis added).  
There are two related limitations in that approach. First, as Golder and Stramski went on to 
point out, it emphasises the central tendency as opposed to the distribution of citizen 
preferences. In other words, it takes no account of whether and how opinions vary. Second, it 
undersells the representational capacity of political parties. While the ‘responsible party’ model 
of representation (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Powell, 2004; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999) 
acknowledges parties as the crucial linkage between public preferences and policy making, the 
focus remains on governments. It is by gaining office and enacting their programmes that 
parties are held to represent their voters. The notion that parties might fulfil representative 
functions while in opposition is largely ignored. 
In response to those limitations, recent studies have begun to examine the representativeness 
of the party system. The relevant congruence here is not one-to-one, between the median 
citizen and the government, but many-to-many, between the distributions of ideological 
preferences in the electorate and in the party system. Golder and Stramski themselves led the 
way, citing ‘the ideal of having a legislature that accurately reflects the ideological preferences 
of the citizenry as a whole’ (2010, p. 91; for a forerunner of this analysis, see Weissberg, 1978). 
On this reading of congruence, they find that proportional representation systems outperform 
majoritarian systems, generating parliaments that better represent the ideological diversity 
within their electorates (see also Dow, 2011). 
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This helps to explain why Andeweg (2011), examining the highly proportional system of the 
Netherlands, found high and increasing levels of congruence between the distribution of voters’ 
and MPs’ left-right positions. At the other extreme, Author (2014) find that centripetal 
pressures in the UK’s majoritarian system have eroded congruence. Dramatic ideological 
convergence by the major parties has left them unable to cater for the broader spread of 
opinion within the electorate. This is a specific example of the general tendency, highlighted in 
the agent-based models reported by Laver and Sergenti (2011), for vote-seeking parties to 
outperform parties that remain ideologically representative of their traditional or current 
supporters. Downsian party competition may increase the representativeness of governments, 
but it is prone also to work against the representativeness of the party system unless – as in the 
case of the Netherlands – new parties can emerge to occupy the territory vacated by 
converging major parties.  
While these studies share a broad purpose, they differ somewhat in their empirical approach to 
many-to-many representation. Golder and Stramski (2010) draw cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs) for both citizens and parties within a country. (See Andeweg 2011 for a similar 
approach.) The (un)representativeness of a party system is thus a matter of how far the area 
between those two CDFs differs from zero. One inevitable source of disjuncture is the fact that, 
while voters are distributed quasi-continuously across the ideological spectrum, parties are few 
and (sometimes) far between. That point underlies the different approach taken by Laver 
(2011) and Author (2014), who focus on distances rather than distributions. For them, the 
hypothetical ideal is one in which every voter has a party at his or her ideological location but, 
given a limited number of parties, the ideal configuration is one which at least minimises voter-
party distances. Laver, for example, shows that if voters are normally distributed along a 
spectrum then representation in a two-party system is maximised where those parties are 
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roughly ±0.8 standard deviations from the mean voter (2011, 494). This points to a 
straightforward measure of party system representativeness: the mean distance between 
citizens and their nearest party. Thus, although party system representativeness is a 
characteristic of a political system, it can be operationalized by aggregating an individual-level 
indicator. And that individual-level variable, the distance between an elector and his or her 
nearest party, is central to this article because we are interested in individual citizens’ sense of 
being represented. For brevity and variety, we will sometimes refer to this individual-level 
variable as representational distance. While the hypothetical ideal, as outlined above, is a 
distance of zero where the party represents exactly what a voter wants, citizens probably 
accept that they cannot demand a party in full and precise agreement with them. What they 
would seek is a party that is at least close to them ideologically. How close is close enough, of 
course, is an empirical question.  
The literature reviewed so far has been based conceptually on a single ideological spectrum. In 
practice, this has invariably been the left-right dimension which is the predominant structuring 
principle in the Western democracies covered. It is worth noting, however, that 
representational distances can be conceived of and calculated on more than one dimension. At 
the individual level, a citizen may be well represented on one dimension but have no nearby 
party on another. Or she may be well represented on both dimensions but by different parties. 
In this article, we extend research in this field by examining the effects of being represented by 
a party on a European unification dimension as well as on the left-right spectrum – and by 
showing that both of those matter. 
3. Representational distance and satisfaction with democracy 
Laver’s (2011) study was titled “Why vote-seeking parties may make voters miserable”. The 
implicit claim is that voters who cannot find a party which shares their policy outlook are likely 
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to be dissatisfied with the situation. The core idea is encapsulated in the CSES question “Would 
you say that any of the parties in [country] represent your views reasonably well?” 
Unsurprisingly, those who answered ‘yes’ to this question proved much happier with electoral 
democracy more generally (Wessels, 2011, 106). The implication, that voters derive intrinsic 
satisfaction from feeling that there is a party that shares their views, is the core hypothesis in 
this paper.  
As indicated by the phrase ‘intrinsic satisfaction’, our argument is that ideological 
representation goes beyond tangible policy outputs and the composition of governments. 
There is an analogy here with party identification, which is also positively associated with 
satisfaction with electoral democracy, again independently of whether the party gains office 
(Clarke et al., 2004, 306). In other words, attachment to the political system is fostered by a 
feeling of connection to one of the players. And representation offers another way in which 
citizens might identify ‘their’ party. Party identification may make for stronger ties than spatial 
representation but, in a world of ‘parties without partisans’ (Dalton, 2002), the 
representational role of parties is if anything even more important. For the increasing 
proportion of voters with loose partisan moorings, the next best thing could well be to feel that 
at least there is a party sharing their political outlook. 
However, there are also what might be termed instrumental explanations for an effect of 
representational distance. Sartori’s (1976) distinction between ‘coalition potential’ and 
‘blackmail potential’ highlights two of these. Citizens may appreciate that a party sharing their 
outlook has at least the potential to apply it in future administration. They may also feel that a 
party expressing their views, even from opposition, has the potential to influence governing 
parties and, in turn, policy. These more instrumental arguments suggest interaction between 
distance to the nearest party and characteristics of that party such as size or incumbency. It 
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seems plausible that the satisfaction derived from a proximate option is tempered if that party 
is too small or too remote from office to be able to deliver the shared objectives. But our core 
claim remains that there will be some such satisfaction, even if tempered. Even a small party 
can offer citizens a political voice.  
While there are a number of specific system evaluations that could be influenced by 
representational distances, our focus in this article is on satisfaction with democracy. There are 
three reasons why democratic satisfaction is an apt dependent variable. One is that, as a 
general measure of political support, it tests the capacity of representational perceptions to 
shape not only immediate assessments of elections and voting but also broader evaluations of 
the system. The second is its ubiquity in this subfield of comparative research. Significant issues 
of content and measurement validity notwithstanding (Canache et al., 2001, Linde and Ekman, 
2003), satisfaction with democracy has become comfortably the most common means of 
gauging the effects of various institutional and political variables on public opinion (Anderson 
and Guillory 1997, Karp, Banducci and Bowler, 2003, Blais and Gelineau, 2007, Aarts and 
Thomassen, 2008, Wagner, Schneider and Halla, 2009, Hobolt, 2012). Specifically, it has been 
used in the few studies to date to examine the impact of party system characteristics on system 
support. Ezrow and Xezonakis (2011) show that mean satisfaction in a country increases as the 
average party converges on the mean voter. Moving from the aggregate to the individual level, 
Kim’s (2009) analysis confirms that a voter’s distance from the ideological position of the 
median party in parliament is negatively associated with her satisfaction with democracy. (The 
same is true if distance is measured in terms of issue priorities rather than in policy space: 
Reher (2015), using the same EES database as we do, compares the concerns of individual 
voters with those of representatives in their country, and finds that a closer match boosts that 
individual’s satisfaction.) Finally, Mayne and Hakhverdian (2016) investigate both the 
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individual- and aggregate-level effects of congruence on citizen satisfaction: they find that 
‘egocentric congruence’, i.e. an individual’s closeness to either the government or the median 
legislator, matters strongly, while the ‘sociotropic’ version, i.e. living in a country with higher 
levels of many-to-many congruence (measured through Golder and Stramski’s cumulative 
distribution functions) does not. 
None of this addresses the central question for this article, however, which is whether 
satisfaction is also dependent on a voter’s distance from the position of her nearest party – that 
is, whether representation is about parties as well as governments or legislatures. There is 
some indirect evidence pointing in that direction courtesy of Lefkofridi, Giger and Gallego 
(2014). They show that the more distant a voter’s policy position is from that of her most 
proximate party, the higher the likelihood of electoral abstention, and most notably so when PR 
systems fail to cater to citizens that hold more ideologically extreme positions. While their 
research interest lies with the behavioural rather than attitudinal consequences of 
representational distance, the findings are of relevance here exactly because we highlight a 
potential reason why distance might induce abstention: that is, disillusionment due to an 
insufficiently representative party system. Such disillusionment is of course likely to extend – 
and to matter – beyond non-voters.  
We therefore want to know whether representational distance affects deeper system 
attachments beyond simply shaping the voter’s calculus at election time. To our knowledge, 
two studies have considered this. In the British context, and focusing only on the two major 
contenders for office, Author (2014) found a clearly significant relationship between 
representational distance and satisfaction with democracy. The size of that effect was 
considerable, too, being exceeded only by the effects of variables like political trust and 
approval of the government’s record, variables that are troublingly similar – and thus 
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potentially endogenous to – the dependent variable. However, given the idiosyncrasy – 
especially within a European context – of the British electoral and party system, it is at least 
worth investigating whether the same is true in countries with more parties, more ideological 
diversity and a less pronounced trend to convergence? Dahlberg and Holmberg’s (2014) 
analysis of CSES data suggests that it does. They find a significant and substantively (if not 
democratically) healthy negative association between a voter’s distance to the party for which 
they voted and her satisfaction with democracy.  
Since Dahlberg and Holmberg’s main interest lay in comparing ideological proximity with more 
valence-flavoured influences on democratic satisfaction, they do not look in detail at that effect 
of representational distance. One way that we move beyond their work is to consider this 
important effect: its size, its form and its plausible moderators. Another is to reintroduce a 
group not included in their analysis but, in this context, arguably the most important: non-
voters. By measuring distance in terms of the party voted for, Dahlberg and Holmberg exclude 
exactly those citizens shown by Lefkofridi, Giger and Gallego (2014) to be on average furthest 
from their nearest party – and in many cases likely to be frustrated into abstention by it.  
A third way in which we build beyond this previous work is to extend analysis beyond the left-
right dimension. While this is indeed the main structuring dimension in European politics 
(Hellwig, 2008; McAllister and White, 2007), that is not to say that the unidimensionality of the 
Hotelling-Downs model reflects the reality of party competition in most European countries. 
Other issues and dimensions are at play, too. And, insofar as voters are concerned with these 
other dimensions, here too they should be more satisfied if their views are represented. 
Stecker and Tausenpfund (2016) have recently shown as much in the closely related context of 
citizen-government congruence. In what is effectively an extension of Kim’s (2009) work, they 
found that citizens are less satisfied with democracy when their views differ from that of the 
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government on various policy dimensions beyond the general left-right axis. One such was the 
issue of European integration, a significant divider now in many EU member states 
(Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, Hooghe and Marks, 2005, Marks et al. 2006, De Vries, 2007). The 
use of EES data allows us to test for effects of representational distance – in our case, not from 
government but from the nearest party – on that additional and cross-cutting policy dimension. 
Our core thesis thus translates into two specific hypotheses:  
H1:  Those further from the nearest party on the left-right scale are less satisfied with 
democracy 
H2:  Those further from the nearest party on the European unification scale are less satisfied 
with democracy 
The relationship between these two dimensions has been the focus of much previous research 
(Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; Bakker et al. 2015). For 
present purposes, two things stand out. First, the dimensions are sufficiently distinct or cross-
cutting for us to expect distances on each to have an independent impact on satisfaction with 
democracy. Second, since left-right remains generally the dominant dimension across the 
continent (Hellwig, 2008), we also hypothesise that: 
H3: The effect on satisfaction with democracy is stronger for distance on the left-right 
dimension than for distances on the European unification dimension 
Two additional points are worth noting about H1 and H2 in particular. The first concerns the 
functional form of the relationships hypothesised. Both Dahlberg and Holmberg (2014) and 
Author (2014) assume a linear effect of distance from the nearest party – or, at least, they do 
not test for any non-linearity whereby, for example, citizens tolerate a certain amount of 
distance before becoming irate at the lack of representation. While our expectations about 
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functional form are not strong enough to warrant a specific hypothesis, there are certainly 
grounds to doubt linearity and so we will relax that assumption. This allows us to address the 
question of “how close is close enough?” - that is, to identify the amount of representational 
distance that citizens will tolerate - and to see whether the answer to that question is 
consistent across both ideological dimensions. 
The second point is that these effects should be robust to controlling for characteristics of 
those nearest parties. Two related such characteristics are of particular interest here: the size 
of that nearest party and whether it is in government. Neither has been considered in previous 
work but both are highly relevant in some of the more fragmented party systems in Europe, 
where many citizens’ nearest party will be very small and/or stand little chance of participating 
in government. The plentiful evidence of “winner’s bonuses” leads us to expect a main effect of 
incumbency: that is, those whose nearest party is in office are likely to be more satisfied with 
democracy (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; Curini et al., 2012). For 
similar reasons of enhanced representation, we would also expect a main effect of size of 
nearest party. However, our core claim is that citizens can derive satisfaction from knowing that 
their views are represented in the party system, even if by a smaller and less powerful player. 
We provide a dual test of that claim: first, by establishing whether H1 and H2 hold when 
controlling for size and incumbency; second, by specifying interactions between 
representational distances and these variables. As argued above, there are theoretical reasons 
to expect the effect of distance to be partly moderated by incumbency or size. But our main 
concern is whether a main effect of distance remains even allowing for those interactions. This 




Data and research design 
While the analyses in this paper are cross-national, the unit of analysis remains the individual 
citizen. We could shift up a level and correlate mean distance to the nearest party with mean 
satisfaction across countries and across time. But that kind of aggregate-level analysis is 
plagued by a shortage of observations and a surfeit of variables that really need to be 
controlled to allow for causal inference. More fundamentally, unless and until we establish that 
the individual-level relationship hypothesised above actually holds, there is no theoretical basis 
to anticipate an aggregate-level effect. 
There are two major cross-national survey data sources which offer the key individual-level 
variables – ideological placements and satisfaction with democracy – necessary for testing our 
hypotheses. These are the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the European 
Election Study (EES) series. Although the former offers a wider range of countries, the latter 
nonetheless offers plenty of diversity in party systems and country characteristics. It also offers 
the crucial advantage over the CSES that it includes placements on a consistent and comparable 
second dimension, namely attitudes to European unification, allowing us to test the effect of 
distances along two dimensions of varying political importance. This is an important step 
beyond previous studies in this sub-field – and is therefore why we opt for the EES.  
The EES takes the form of post-election surveys fielded in EU member states following each 
European Parliament election. By combining data from five EES, from 1989 to 2009,1 we 
accumulate a huge sample of over 60,000 respondents. All five studies include the same battery 
of questions based on a 1 to 10 scale,2 with respondents asked to place both themselves and 
 
1 The 2014 study is left out because it did not include a measure of our dependent variable, 
satisfaction with democracy.  
2 This was changed to a 0-10 scale for the 2009 study. 
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their perceived positions of all political parties with parliamentary representation. Given hefty 
proportions of non-response on the ideological placement scales, especially when respondents 
were asked to locate smaller parties, our inclusion criterion is permissive: the analyses are 
based on every respondent that located herself and at least one party.  
Any analysis based on voter-party distances involves a choice between subjective (i.e. 
respondents’ own) placement of parties and more objective measures. We opt for the former, 
since our theoretical argument is about the way that citizens see the party options around 
them. The fact that individual party placements measure the perceived rather than the ‘true’ 
positions of parties is, as Golder and Stramski point out, “not a problem if we are interested in 
evaluating how well citizens feel they are being represented; indeed, it would seem to be an 
advantage in these circumstances” (2010, 99). Consider two citizens who both place themselves 
at point 2 on a left-right scale but who disagree about whether the mainstream left party is at 
point 3 or 4. This is variation that we suggest matters for satisfaction. Yet it would be lost if 
both citizens were placed at the same distance from the party’s mean placement of 3.5. This 
simple example illustrates why we opt for individual placements over one likely alternative, 
which is to use data from all respondents to calculate a mean party placement. This ‘wisdom of 
crowds’ approach is a sensible one if the aim is to clean away individual variation in order to 
obtain a single party placement to use in aggregate-level analysis (e.g. Alvarez and Nagler, 
2004; Rehm and Reilly, 2009). However, that individual variation is central to our theoretical 
mechanism. That same objection would apply to the use of external sources such as expert 
judgments of party positions or content analysis of platforms; these also raise various issues of 
comparability – notably differences in the meaning and measurement of the ideological 
dimensions (Golder and Stramski, 2010, 98-99).  
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We therefore calculated, for all respondents across up to 27 countries (in 2009) and five 
European elections, their nearest party and distance to that party on the left-right scale. We did 
the same for distances on the EU unification scale which is available for the later three EES in 
the series. It is worth emphasising that our analysis is not intended to take account of voting 
behaviour. We could have followed Dahlberg and Holmberg (2014) in measuring distance to the 
party for which a respondent voted, either at that European or the previous general election. 
However, excluding non-voters might lead to understating both the extent of representational 
distance and its effect. Our choice of distance to the nearest party reflects our core argument 
that citizens derive satisfaction from having an ideologically proximate party that shares and 
expresses their views, at least to some extent independently of electoral calculations. 
The dependent variable is the long-established question measuring respondents’ satisfaction 
with democracy in their own country, using a four-point scale from very satisfied to very 
dissatisfied. While there has been much valid criticism of this measure (Canache et al., 2001; 
Linde and Ekman, 2003), it remains ubiquitous in cross-national survey research and, for 
reasons discussed earlier, is substantively a good choice for this analysis. 
While individual EES questionnaires offer an extensive range of control variables, the field 
narrows when we seek questions asked in all five election studies. Nonetheless, we are able to 
include a reasonable battery of controls that have been shown to influence satisfaction with 
democracy at the individual level, notably age, sex, education, subjective social class, party 
identification, and of course left-right and EU positions themselves (and their squared terms, 
measuring extremity).3 We also included a measure of how the respondent’s ideologically 
 
3 It is worth adding that the nature of our independent variable eases concerns that its 
measured effect is inflated by omitted variable bias. If we had measured representational 
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closest party was treated by the electoral system: a ratio of its seat share to vote share 
(standardized by country). This proves more influential over satisfaction than does the overall 
proportionality of the system (Ferland, 2015). The models also feature key predictors from 
previous aggregate-level models of democratic satisfaction (e.g. Reher, 2015; Ezrow and 
Xezonakis, 2011; Bernauer and Vatter, 2012; Curini et al., 2012): GDP per capita, 
disproportionality of the electoral system (as measured by the Gallagher index); and Eastern 
European dummy for years in which it offers variation within the EES; a dummy and the logged 
number of days since the last national election. We also include a measure of the overall range 
of ideological choice, as captured by the standard deviation of respondents’ mean party 
placements on both the left-right and the EU dimensions.  
At the party level, as discussed above, we include incumbency and party size as control and 
interacting variables. We use vote shares – from the national election directly preceding the EP 
election in question – to measure the size of the nearest party.4 In the plenty of cases in which 
respondents are equidistant from two or more parties, we measured the size of the largest 
party. By a similar logic of assuming that citizens focus on the strongest option, we measured 
incumbency in terms of whether any of a respondent’s closest parties was in national 
government at the time of the EP election. It is worth clarifying that, while we use the EES 
 
distance by a single direct item, like for example the CSES question “Would you say that any of 
the parties in [country] represent your views reasonably well?”, there would rightly be concern 
that a general disillusionment was creating a spurious association between that variable and 
satisfaction with democracy. However, our measure is based on separate placement questions, 
less directly or immediately connected to the dependent variable. 
4 In the very few cases where no national election data was available – such as with newly 
emerged parties or electoral coalitions, or those which stand only in European elections – then 
we used the results from the European election corresponding to that EES.  
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because it provides comparable data and on both left-right and European integration 
dimensions, our interest is in how ideological distance plays out in national politics. This is why 
our measures of party size are based on the previous national election and not measured at the 
European Parliament election in question (where the second-order flavour of the contest tends 
temporarily to inflate – and thus to exaggerate the representational potential – of smaller 
parties). 
Finally, in models including both left-right and EU distance variables, we take into account 
whether it is the same party that is closest to the respondent on the two dimensions. The 
argument here is that, since citizens can ultimately only vote for one party, there should be a 
satisfaction bonus from being catered for by the same party on both dimensions. However, 
since our theoretical argument is about feeling represented in general, not at a specific 
election, we do not wish to preclude the possibility that a citizen can derive satisfaction from 
representation by different parties on the different dimensions. This is one reason why we 
otherwise analyse distances separately rather than, for example, calculating a Euclidian 
distance to the nearest party in two-dimensional space. Another reason is that combining the 
two dimensions into one distance measure would involve assumptions about relative 
importance, something that instead we want to emerge empirically from analysis. A third 
reason is that the two dimensions are largely orthogonal in two respects: neither self-
placements nor distances to the nearest party are much correlated across the two dimensions.5 
Being separate, then, they are treated as such in our analysis.  
 
5 As Appendix Table A1 shows, the correlations between nearest-party distances on the two 
dimensions are non-significant in most country-years (and not large in the other cases). Finding 
a perfect match with a party on one dimension does not make a respondent much likelier to 






Prior to investigating their effects on satisfaction with democracy, it is useful to describe the 
distributions of our key representational distance variables. These, based on the pooled sample 
across countries, are shown in Table 1 for the left-right and European unification dimensions in 
each EES year for which those scales were available (i.e. 1989-2009 for left-right and 1999-2009 
for European unification, which is why the sample size for the European unification analysis is 
smaller throughout ). The upper panel reports the distributions of the two distance variables, 
while the lower panel reports descriptive statistics for distances on each scale by year. The first 
thing to note is that zero is comfortably the modal distance on both the left-right and European 
unification scales. This explains why the means are uniformly on the low side – less than one 
point on each dimension in each year. It is very unusual for respondents to lie a long way away 
from their nearest party. On the whole, this is heartening. It means that party systems are not 
widely perceived as unrepresentative and that dissatisfaction from feeling unrepresented is 





Descriptive statistics for distances to nearest party on left-right and European unification 
scales 
 




% of respondents  
(pooled, 1989-2009)  
% of respondents  
(pooled, 1999-2009) 
0  66    59  
1  25    24  
2  6    9  
3  2    4  
4  1    2  
5+  0    2  
Mean  0.47    0.71  
s.d.  0.81    1.12  
N  61,074    38,880  
        Distances 
by year Mean s.d. N  Mean s.d. N 
1989 0.41 0.70 4,064     
1994 0.44 0.72 9,678     
1999 0.42 0.78 9,088  0.67 1.09 7,355 
2004 0.47 0.80 17,452  0.68 1.05 14,482 
2009 0.51 0.89 20,792  0.76 1.19 17,043 
 
Several caveats are necessary, however, before drawing too sanguine a conclusion. First, many 
of those with zero distance will be party identifiers, prone to assimilation whereby they bring 
either their chosen party’s placement into line with their own or vice versa. Even if this bias has 
an important substantive corollary – party identification being an important channel through 
which many citizens feel represented – it does mean that the picture in terms of party system 
representativeness is probably less rosy than implied by Table 1. Second, the proportion of 
zeros will be further inflated by the widespread tendency among respondents to satisfice on 
these cognitively arduous items by using the midpoint of the scale. If they do the same for 
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themselves and any unfamiliar party, they will automatically record a distance of zero.6 On the 
more concrete European unification scale, along which citizens are less clustered at the scale 
midpoint, nearest parties tended to lie more at a distance. Third, if distance does indeed lead to 
dissatisfaction and disengagement, non-response bias has probably attenuated these mean 
distances – those who feel less well represented that are more likely to refuse to complete an 
election survey. Finally, there is evidence that representational distances have recently 
widened. Table 1 shows no steady upward trend but clear evidence that the mean distance on 
both dimensions increased appreciably between 2004 and 2009. If representational distances 
do take a toll on democratic satisfaction, then that toll will have increased recently. 
Our main business in this section is to test whether representational distance does indeed 
negatively affect satisfaction. In the first analysis, we pool all five EES datasets to generate an 
overall indication of any impact of left-right representational distances over the 1989-2009 
period. In order to test for possible nonlinearity of distance effects, we transform our main 
independent variable into a series of dummy variables and use zero distance as the base 
category. Given that, as Table 1 showed, only small minorities of respondents lie a very long 
way from their nearest party, we collapse these into a ‘3+’ category.7 To reflect the non-
 
6 We considered omitting from analysis any respondents who placed both themselves and 
every party at the midpoint, on the grounds that they did not seem to understand the 
questions. However, such a stringent exclusion criterion would have removed less than 1% of 
all cases. Rather than applying some looser but ultimately arbitrary criterion based on frequent 
use of the midpoint, we prefer simply to warn that our data will understate mean distances 
among that subgroup that does recognise and understand left and right. 
7 We ran alternative models, only collapsing those at five or more points distance from their 
nearest party, but the additional dummy variables offer little extra explanatory power since 
distance effects tend to plateau. 
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independence of observations in the data, we run multi-level mixed-effects regressions, nesting 
respondents within countries.8 These are ordered logistic models, reflecting the categorical 
nature of our dependent variable. We relax the proportional odds assumption, not only 
because a Brant test suggests that we should but also because we have a priori grounds at least 
to question that assumption. Given that most people are adjacent or at least close to a party, it 
seems quite feasible that distance’s primary impact is to exacerbate dissatisfaction rather than 
to dampen satisfaction, and hence it will have different effects along the range of our 
dependent variable. The results – coefficients and standard errors – for the main left-right 




8 Strictly, respondents are nested within country-years. However, since there were too few 
survey years to allow us to treat ‘year’ as another level within the mixed-effects modelling, we 
instead simply include survey year as an additional control variable. The analyses were run 
using R’s clmm command (package Ordinal). Full replication code and data are available.  
9 The tables presented here and in the appendix are based on identical models, Table 2 (in text) 
merely omits figures for the control variables for the sake of brevity. In this and subsequent 




Left-right distance coefficients from mixed-effects ordered logistic regressions of satisfaction 
with democracy (pooled EES 1989-2009) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
Left-Right self-placement 0.047** 0.003 0.038** 0.003 0.039** 0.003 
Left-Right self-placement2 -0.014** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 
LR distance to nearest party (base = 0)      
   Distance = 1  -0.072**   0.018  -0.112** 0.018  -0.091**   0.028  
   Distance = 2  -0.188**   0.034  -0.203** 0.034  -0.236**   0.053  
   Distance = 3+  -0.216**   0.047  -0.282** 0.047  -0.241**   0.075  
Size of nearest party on LR (log)   0.048** 0.010  0.049**   0.012  
LR distance * party size interactions:      
   Distance = 1 * size      0.009   0.024  
   Distance = 2 * size      0.009   0.046  
   Distance = 3+ * size      0.052   0.061  
Nearest LR party incumbent   0.383** 0.018  0.385**   0.021  
LR distance * incumbency interaction:      
   Distance = 1 * incumbency     -0.062 0.039 
   Distance = 2 * incumbency     0.054 0.076 
   Distance = 3+ * incumbency     -0.085 0.108 
       
Thresholds       
Not at all | Not very satisfied -1.640  0.358  -2.138  0.195  -1.653 0.314 
Not very | Fairly satisfied 0.297  0.358  -0.175  0.194  0.305 0.314 
Fairly satisfied | Very satisfied 3.107  0.358  2.681  0.195  3.164 0.314        
N (respondents) 61,074 61,074 61,074 
N (systems) 29 29 29 
Var. (countries) 0.715 0.534 1.024 
Log-Likelihood -67,717 -67,318 -67,333 
AIC 135,484 134,691 134,732 
Summarized table: control variables included, reported in Table A2 (appendix). 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
Model 1 provides the first straightforward test of H1, and it passes that test. All three distance 
coefficients are negative and significant (at the p<0.01 level). Other things remaining the same, 
the further away a voter’s nearest party is on the left-right scale, the less satisfied is that voter 
with democracy in her country. The coefficients tend to vindicate our decision not to assume 
linearity in the distance effect, implying instead a more sigmoid form. Citizens are not much less 
satisfied if their nearest party lies just one point away (and, given the very large sample, the 
fact that the difference is statistically significant is not telling). Once representational distance 
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stretches to two points, however, there are more marked effects on satisfaction, but these then 
level off judging by the limited difference between the second and third coefficients.10 
We now subject the distance effect to a series of tests – of its conditionality, of its robustness 
and of its size. First, in Model 2, we introduce the size of the nearest party and incumbency 
status. Both size of nearest party and incumbency show significant and positive effects on 
satisfaction with democracy. Neither of these comes as a surprise, although it is perhaps 
noteworthy that citizens feel a benefit in having a larger party nearby, even if it is in opposition. 
The more important point, however, is the continued significance and increased strength of the 
distance effect. Voters derive satisfaction from feeling represented by a nearby party even if it 
is small and out of office. 
In Model 3, we introduce interactions between representational distance and these party 
characteristic variables, testing whether distance effects are conditional on incumbency or size. 
None of the interactions is statistically significant (and the same is true if the incumbency and 
size interactions are entered separately). The benefits of having a proximate party are not 
dependent on that party’s size or its access to power. And that main effect of distance remains 
clearly negative and significant. This is clear support for our broader argument that satisfaction 
is not just about winners and outputs.  
One approach to robustness is to check whether the distance effect is replicated in each EES 
year. Full results from these single-year models are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. The 
key points are these: First, fourteen out of fifteen distance coefficients are negative. Ten of 
these are significant (p<0.05, for most p<0.01) and the exceptions are usually healthy in size but 
 
10 Alternative analyses including dummy variables for distances from nearest party of up to 5+ 
points confirm this pattern. (See the online appendix for these analyses.)  
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with large standard errors given the limited overall sample size or small numbers of 
respondents at three or more points from their nearest party. So there is fairly consistent 
support for H1. What is less consistent is the amount of distance tolerated. In some years, there 
is no significant effect among those who are one point from their nearest party, while in other 
years even that distance is enough to erode satisfaction. Another point worth noting is that 
there is no clear indication of distance effects either strengthening or weakening over time. 
Table 1 shows that mean distance on left-right has increased in recent years; the results for the 
2009 model in Table A3 show that this continues to matter for satisfaction.  
A second robustness test takes advantage of the fact that the 2009 EES offers a wider variety of 
individual-level controls than was available for the full set of study years. As Appendix Table A4 
shows, some of these variables – notably government approval and economic evaluations – are 
very powerful predictors of satisfaction with democracy. However, as that table also shows, 
controlling for these variables does rather little to dampen the effect of distance to nearest 
party. The significant negative effects remain so. This is true despite the fact that, because 
variables like government approval and political interest are if anything causally posterior to 
representational distance (as well as potentially endogenous to satisfaction with democracy), 
we are almost certainly over-controlling in this model.  
A third robustness test comes from checking whether the effects for left-right distance are 
much weakened once we also consider self- and party-placements on the second dimension, 
that of European unification. These variables are introduced in the two models in Table 3: first, 
in Model 4, including only the EU distance variables; second, in Model 5, including left-right and 
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EU distances together.11 Comparing the left-right coefficients between Model 2 and Model 5 is 
the cleanest way of examining the impact of including distances on the EU dimension.12 All 
three left-right distance coefficients in Model 5 are a little weaker than their equivalents in 
Model 2, but each remains negative and significant. Unsurprisingly, given the meagre 
correlation between distances on the two scales that we noted earlier, the dimensions operate 
at least partly independently and representational distance on the left-right spectrum 




11 Since the interactions with party size and incumbency were uniformly non-significant in 
Model 3, for simplicity and to avoid collinearity problems we omit them from subsequent 
specifications. 
12 Even this comparison is confounded by the fact that Model 5 is estimated only on the latter 
three EES. For cleaner comparison, we re-ran Model 2 but only on the 1999-2009 subset of the 
sample (N=38,880) used to estimate Model 5. The left-right distance effects in this re-estimated 
Model 2 were very similar to those in the original version in Table 2. So the perceptible 
weakening of the left-right coefficients in Model 5 is the result of introducing the EU dimension 




Left-right and EU distance coefficients from mixed-effects ordered logistic regressions of 
satisfaction with democracy (EES 1999-2009) 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 
 B s.e. b s.e. 
Left-Right self-placement   0.040** 0.004 
Left-Right self-placement2   -0.009** 0.001 
LR distance to nearest party (base = 0) 
   Distance = 1    -0.084**   0.023  
   Distance = 2    -0.174**   0.043  
   Distance = 3+    -0.205**   0.060  
Size of nearest party on LR (log)    0.043**   0.013  
Nearest LR party incumbent    0.367**   0.022       
EU self-placement 0.093** 0.004  0.096**   0.004  
EU self-placement2 -0.015** 0.001  -0.015**   0.001      
EU distance to nearest party (base = 0) 
   Distance = 1 -0.030 0.024  -0.025   0.024  
   Distance = 2 -0.005 0.034  0.002   0.035  
   Distance = 3+ -0.210** 0.038  -0.194**   0.038  
Size of nearest party on EU (log) 0.005 0.014 -0.019 0.014     
Nearest EU party incumbent 0.239** 0.023 0.176** 0.024     
Same party nearest on LR and EU   -0.063** 0.021 
          
Cut points     
Not at all | Not very satisfied -2.0976         0.196  -1.536 0.217 
Not very | Fairly satisfied -0.1119         0.196  0.474 0.217 
Fairly satisfied | Very satisfied 2.781         0.197  3.399 0.218 
   
N (respondents) 38,880 38,880 
N (systems) 27 27 
Var. (countries) 0.447 0.492 
Log-Likelihood -42,260 -41,961 
AIC 84,570 83,994 
Summarized table: control variables included, reported in Table A2-II (appendix) 
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
 
Of course, our main interest in Models 4 and 5 is in whether distance to nearest party on the 
European unification scale has the independent effect on democratic satisfaction as specified in 
H2. The answer is that it does – but only after a certain point. Only those who are three or more 
points from their nearest party on the EU scale are significantly less satisfied with democracy 
than those at the same point as their closest party (i.e. with a distance of zero). This same 
pattern obtains in both models – that is, regardless of whether left-right distances are also 
taken into consideration. So representational distance matters – eventually – on more than one 
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dimension. The fact that distance effects take longer to ‘kick in’ on the European unification 
scale provides some support for H3, i.e. that left-right distances matter more in these European 
party systems. Even at three points or more, when the EU distance effect becomes clearly 
significant, it is rather weaker (at -.187) than the equivalent on left-right (-.258) – although the 
overlapping standard errors confirm that those coefficients are not statistically significantly 
different. Considered as a whole, however, the effect sizes for left-right distances are 
appreciably larger than for the EU scale.  
Moving on from robustness tests, we also want to assess how sizeable our effects are. In a first 
step, we look at relative effect size by comparing them with those of other familiar predictors 
from the satisfaction with democracy literature. Since mixed-effects ordered logistic models do 
not yield easily comparable coefficients, we use a model-improvement strategy to assess the 
relative importance of our variables of interest vis-a-vis other independent variables from the 
2009 EES model presented in Appendix Table A4. Having calculated the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) for a base model, we then compared the effect on that AIC of adding each 
predictor separately to that model. The collective effect of representational distance (left-right 
and EU) relative to that of other variables was less than that of the heaviest hitters such as 
retrospective economic evaluations but equal to that of party identification, an important 
source of affective system attachments, and greater than that of political interest. Consistent 
with the suggestion above that left-right and EU distances ultimately have equal importance 
(given the stronger coefficients for left-right but the longer average distances on the EU scale), 
the two sets of representational distance dummies had a near equal effect on AIC. In any event, 
we can conclude that representational distances are one of the factors making a noteworthy 
contribution to explaining democratic satisfaction. 
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To examine the absolute size of these effects, we plot the effect of distance on the predicted 
probabilities of being in each category of the satisfaction dependent variable.13  The patterns 
indicated by the regression are clear enough (even if overall statistical significance can be 
obscured by graphs which break the effect down across points on the dependent variable 
scale).  The effects of left-right distance are stronger and kick in sooner; things barely change in 
the EU graph until the distances of three or more points.  The gradients are not dramatic: as 
acknowledged above, these distances make an incremental rather than a major contribution to 
satisfaction with democracy. This is particularly true when it comes to the extreme categories: 
in particular, those finding other reasons to be ‘very satisfied’ are not much troubled by 
distances.  However, the left-right effects on the intermediate categories are clearer such that, 
if we divide the scale into ‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’, there is an appreciable effect.  Among 
those who are within one point of their closest party on the left-right scale, a majority (55%) is 
on the satisfied side of the fence.  Among those two or more points away, a slight majority is 
dissatisfied.  
 
13 These probabilities are calculated holding other interval-level independent variables at their 
means and dichotomous predictors at their modes. Figure 1 therefore shows the predicted 
probabilities for a female party identifier whose closest party is not an incumbent and whose 
scores on all other variables are at their means. This is not an unusual case. 
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Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of being in each category of satisfaction with democracy 
given distance to nearest party on a) left-right, b) EU dimensions 
 










Empirical studies in this field have been preoccupied with the median voter. How well are his or 
her views reflected by the median legislator or by the elected government and its policies? 
These are reasonable questions but they reflect too narrow a conception of representation – 
especially if we expect that the quality of representation will influence levels of system support. 
Maintaining high rates of satisfaction with democracy involves more than keeping the median 
voter happy. In this article, we show that satisfaction also depends on whether citizens across 
the ideological spectrum perceive a party as representing them on the dimensions and issues 
that matter to them. ‘Valence’ models of democratic satisfaction, focused on government 
performance and delivery (e.g. Clarke et al., 2004, 301-10), are therefore useful but incomplete. 
The public relates to politics via parties since it is parties – small or large, in or out of 
government – who give a public voice to opinions on salient issues.  Our analysis shows that 
voters derive satisfaction from feeling their views represented, even by parties unlikely to be 
able to translate those views into policy. 
The effect size of representational distance, while not large, is comparable with those of some 
other established predictors of satisfaction with democracy such as party identification. Part of 
the reason for the restrained overall effect sizes is that, unsurprisingly given the multi-party 
systems in Europe and a scale of just ten points (and the likelihood that the politically 
disengaged were less likely to respond to the surveys in the first place), few respondents were 
far away from their nearest party. Moreover, some distance is tolerated: parties one point 
away on left-right and even two points away on the European integration scale look to be 
deemed ‘close enough’. However, among that minority facing a long-distance relationship with 
the party system, this distance does have the capacity to generate – and to exacerbate – 
dissatisfaction. The substantive relevance of these effects therefore depends in part on why we 
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care about satisfaction with democracy. If maintaining a reasonable average is what matters, 
then the effects we identify here are not very troublesome. If minimising severe dissatisfaction 
is important, however, then the unrepresentativeness of party systems is a more significant 
problem. A useful next step would be to identify whether satisfaction with democracy mediates 
the negative relationship between representational distance and likelihood to vote identified 
by Lefkofridi et al. (2014). Do those without a proximate party tend to abstain for cognitive 
reasons to do with lower expected benefits, or out of a more affect-driven sense of being 
neglected by the (party) system? 
Our individual-level findings raise the question of what makes for a more representative party 
system – or, in the terms used here, what minimises the distance between voters’ and their 
nearest parties? This calls for more research along the lines of Ana Maria Belchior’s (2013) 
work, scrutinising the institutional and other factors which shape party systems. The related 
factors of electoral system proportionality and number of parties look likely to be prominent 
players. Certainly the trend towards ideological convergence and catch-all parties had the 
potential to leave voters at the margins feeling very remote from the ‘representative action’. 
Aggregate-level modelling of mean distance could be extended to include mean satisfaction 
with democracy as an ultimate dependent variable, thus providing an aggregate-level parallel of 
the analysis presented here. 
In this analysis we used time principally as a source of additional data. Trends were not our 
main focus. That said, there is something striking in the marked upturn in mean distance – and 
thus the decline in party system representativeness – between 2004 and 2009. While careful 
analysis has now established quite convincingly that there is no long-term steady decline in 
variables like satisfaction, engagement and trust, this does not rule out step changes (of the 
sort often held to have happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but largely missed through 
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lack of survey data). The fact that this is a recent development makes it no less significant. Of 
course, 2009 might simply be a blip. However, the events since and especially the results of the 
European elections in 2014 tend to suggest otherwise. They are all eerily consistent with the 
notion of a growing failure of Europe’s party systems to cater for the ideological diversity of 
their citizens. Of course, we should not overstate the case and lapse into ‘crisis hyperbole’. 
Large proportions of citizens nestle comfortably alongside their nearest party, and the effects 
on satisfaction were not dramatic even among those who do not. Still, as with any ailment, 
there is no sense in ignoring it until it becomes serious. Those with an interest in maintaining 
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy need also take an interest in the representativeness of 
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Correlations between nearest-party distances on left-right and EU scales, by country and year 
 Year 
 Country 1999 2004 2009 
Austria .018 .031 .047 
Belgium – Flanders  .144* - .300** 
Belgium – Wallonia .132 - -.055 
Bulgaria  - - .060 
Cyprus - .185** .123** 
Czech Republic - -.004 .007 
Denmark .095** -.026 .101** 
Estonia  - .152** .166** 
Finland .046 -.014 .048 
France .071 .043 .060 
Germany .002 -.094* .086* 
Greece .097 .021 .062 
Hungary - .053 -.016 
Ireland .118* .081** .154** 
Italy .164** .095** .045 
Latvia - .151** .014 
Lithuania - - -.005 
Luxembourg -.097 .018 .057 
Netherlands -.015 .036 .067 
Poland - .161** .028 
Portugal .063 .088* .011 
Romania - - .006 
Slovakia - .027 .132** 
Slovenia - .118** - 
Spain .025 .151** .073* 
Sweden .068 - .022 
United Kingdom .069 -.017 .101** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01. Where data are missing, this indicates that either the relevant 










Full results from Models 1-3 (Table 2) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
Left-Right self-placement 0.047** 0.003 0.038** 0.003 0.039** 0.003 
Left-Right self-placement2 -0.014** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 
LR distance to nearest party (base = 0)      
   Distance = 1  -0.072**   0.018  -0.112** 0.018  -0.091**   0.028  
   Distance = 2  -0.188**   0.034  -0.203** 0.034  -0.236**   0.053  
   Distance = 3+  -0.216**   0.047  -0.282** 0.047  -0.241**   0.075  
Size of nearest party on LR (log)   0.048** 0.010  0.049**   0.012  
LR distance * party size interactions:      
   Distance = 1 * size      0.009   0.024  
   Distance = 2 * size      0.009   0.046  
   Distance = 3+ * size      0.052   0.061  
Nearest LR party incumbent   0.383** 0.018  0.385**   0.021  
LR distance * incumbency interaction:      
   Distance = 1 * incumbency     -0.062 0.039 
   Distance = 2 * incumbency     0.054 0.076 
   Distance = 3+ * incumbency     -0.085 0.108 
Year (base = 2009)       
   1989  0.282**   0.101  -0.307**  0.100  -0.071 0.102 
   1994  -0.114   0.079   -0.554**   0.078  -0.352** 0.080 
   1999  0.201**   0.061   -0.164**   0.061  -0.042 0.062 
   2004  0.024   0.049   -0.234**   0.048  -0.151** 0.049 
GDP per capita (log)  0.146*   0.074   -0.307**   0.073  -0.112 0.075 
Gallagher disproportionality  0.002   0.005   0.006   0.005  0.008 0.005 
Days since last election (log)   0.072**   0.010   0.087**   0.010  0.084** 0.010 
Age  -0.000   0.000   -0.001**   0.000  -0.001** 0.000 
Male  0.108**   0.015   0.113**   0.016  0.129** 0.016 
Age left school  0.006**   0.002   0.007**   0.002  0.007** 0.002 
Subjective social status  0.161**   0.008   0.163**   0.008  0.158** 0.008 
Party identification  0.209**   0.017   0.198**   0.017  0.209** 0.017 
Unemployed 0.346**  0.033   -0.313**   0.033  -0.324** 0.033 
Eastern EU 0.174  0.633   -1.281**   0.304  -0.500 0.517 
Seats/votes ratio (std) 0.087**  0.011   0.041**   0.011  0.043** 0.011 
LR dispersion 0.035**  0.009   0.049**   0.009  0.046** 0.009 
       
Cut points       
Not at all | Not very satisfied -1.640  0.358  -2.138  0.195  -1.653 0.314 
Not very | Fairly satisfied 0.297  0.358  -0.175  0.194  0.305 0.314 
Fairly satisfied | Very satisfied 3.107  0.358  2.681  0.195  3.164 0.314        
N (respondents) 61,074 61,074 61,074 
N (systems) 29 29 29 
Var. (countries) 0.715 0.534 1.024 
Log-Likelihood -67,717 -67,318 -67,333 





Full results from Models 4-5 (Table 3) 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 
 B s.e. b s.e. 
Left-Right self-placement   0.040** 0.004 
Left-Right self-placement2   -0.009** 0.001 
LR distance to nearest party (base = 0) 
   Distance = 1    -0.084**   0.023  
   Distance = 2    -0.174**   0.043  
   Distance = 3+    -0.205**   0.060  
Size of nearest party on LR (log)    0.043**   0.013  
Nearest LR party incumbent    0.367**   0.022       
EU self-placement 0.093** 0.004  0.096**   0.004  
EU self-placement2 -0.015** 0.001  -0.015**   0.001      
EU distance to nearest party (base = 0) 
   Distance = 1 -0.030 0.024  -0.025   0.024  
   Distance = 2 -0.005 0.034  0.002   0.035  
   Distance = 3+ -0.210** 0.038  -0.194**   0.038  
Size of nearest party on EU (log) 0.005 0.014 -0.019 0.014     
Nearest EU party incumbent 0.239** 0.023 0.176** 0.024     
Same party nearest on LR and EU   -0.063** 0.021 
     Year (base = 2009)     
   1999 0.133 0.084 0.172* 0.084 
   2004 -0.012 0.066 0.057 0.066 
GDP per capita (log)  0.173   0.105   0.268*   0.106  
Gallagher disproportionality  0.011   0.009   0.014   0.009  
Days since last election (log)   0.085**   0.016   0.092**   0.017  
Age  0.000   0.001   -0.001   0.001  
Male  0.123**   0.020   0.119**   0.020  
Age left school  -0.001   0.002   0.001   0.002  
Subjective social status  0.184**   0.010   0.161**   0.010  
Party identification  0.185**   0.021   0.188**   0.021  
Unemployed  -0.276**   0.042   -0.272**   0.042  
Eastern EU  -1.052**   0.298   -0.666*   0.324  
LR Seats/votes ratio (std)    0.039**   0.015  
EU Seats/votes ratio (std) 0.020 0.012  0.002   0.012  
LR dispersion    0.067**   0.011  
EU dispersion -0.020* 0.009  -0.024*   0.009  
     
Cut points     
Not at all | Not very satisfied -2.0976         0.196  -1.536 0.217 
Not very | Fairly satisfied -0.1119         0.196  0.474 0.217 
Fairly satisfied | Very satisfied 2.781         0.197  3.399 0.218 
   
N (respondents) 38,880 38,880 
N (systems) 27 27 
Var. (countries) 0.447 0.492 
Log-Likelihood -42,260 -41,961 




Table A3 : Left-right distance effects from models of satisfaction with democracy (separate EES) 
 
  1989   1994   1999   2004   2009   
  b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. B s.e. 
LR self-placement 0.093** 0.015 0.062** 0.010 -0.012 0.009 0.092** 0.007 0.039** 0.005 
LR self-placement2 -0.044** 0.005 -0.028** 0.004 -0.024** 0.003 -0.016** 0.002 -0.008** 0.002 
LR distance to nearest party (base = 0)          
Distance = 1 -0.176*  0.070  -0.126**    0.044  -0.099*    0.050  -0.082*    0.034    0.000    0.031  
Distance = 2 -0.139  0.148  -0.309**    0.088  -0.329**    0.099  -0.121    0.065  -0.176**    0.055  
Distance = 3+ 0.286  0.262  -0.220    0.141  -0.362**    0.135  -0.285**    0.088  -0.256**    0.072  
GDP per capita (log) 0.470  0.362    1.199**    0.386    2.121**    0.496    0.595    0.392    1.765**    0.306  
Gallagher disproportionality -0.014  0.036  -0.032    0.023  -0.016    0.029  -0.046    0.025  -0.055*    0.025  
Days since last election (log)  -0.030  0.070    0.013    0.080    0.252**    0.064  -0.061    0.095    0.057    0.072  
Age -0.002  0.002    0.002    0.001  -0.002    0.001  -0.002*    0.001  -0.001    0.001  
Male 0.078  0.061    0.146**    0.039    0.156**    0.041    0.149**    0.029    0.091**    0.027  
Age left school -0.033**  0.010    0.026**    0.007    0.004    0.005    0.013**    0.005    0.001    0.002  
Subjective social status 0.134**  0.032    0.133**    0.020    0.128**    0.021    0.182**    0.016    0.186**    0.014  
Party identification 0.033  0.067    0.304**    0.045    0.291**    0.046    0.212**    0.032    0.247**    0.029  
Unemployed -0.614**  0.151  -0.321**    0.078  -0.443**    0.093  -0.266**    0.064  -0.155**    0.056  
Eastern EU  -     -    -0.053    0.559     -       -    -0.375    0.575    0.853*    0.396  
LR Seats/votes ratio (std) 0.094**  0.028    0.111**    0.033    0.182**    0.036    0.052**    0.019    0.100**    0.020  
LR dispersion 0.118**  0.040    0.016    0.024    0.065**    0.024    0.044**    0.017    0.013    0.013  
Cut points           
Not at all | Not very satisfied -2.170 0.291 -2.048 0.233 -2.001 0.261 -2.473 0.288 -0.998 0.326 
Not very | Fairly satisfied -0.346 0.288 -0.199 0.232 0.016 0.259 -0.277 0.287 0.935 0.326 
Fairly satisfied | Very satisfied 2.379 0.291 2.506 0.234 3.130 0.263 2.681 0.288 3.780 0.327            
N (respondents) 4,064  9,678  9,088  17,452  20,792  
N (systems) 13  14  16  21  26  
Var. (countries) 0.247  0.245  0.304  0.346  0.192  
Log-Likelihood -4,549  -11,033  -9,494  -18,629  -22,878  







Full results of mixed-effects ordered logit models of satisfaction with democracy including 
additional control variables for 2009 
 
 Original model With added controls 
  b s.e. b s.e. 
LR self-placement 0.033** 0.005 0.026** 0.005 
LR self-placement2 -0.008** 0.002 -0.011** 0.002 
LR distance to nearest party (base = 0)   
 
 
Distance = 1 -0.037 0.033 -0.009 0.034 
Distance = 2 -0.218** 0.058 -0.185** 0.059 
Distance = 3+ -0.313** 0.077 -0.225** 0.078 
Size of nearest party on LR (log) 0.012 0.019 0.042* 0.020 




GDP per capita (log) 1.750** 0.297 1.724** 0.278 
Gallagher disproportionality -0.046 0.024 -0.034 0.022 
Days since last election (log)  0.060 0.070 0.111 0.066 
Age -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Male 0.092** 0.028 0.042 0.029 
Age left school 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
Subjective social status 0.179** 0.015 0.079** 0.017 
Party identification 0.268** 0.030 0.183** 0.031 
Unemployed -0.182** 0.059 -0.092 0.060 
Eastern EU 0.770* 0.385 0.969** 0.360 
LR Seats/votes ratio (std) 0.053* 0.022 0.006 0.023 
LR dispersion 0.021 0.014 0.030* 0.015 
Political Interest   0.041* 0.018 
Government approval    1.168** 0.034 
Subjective standard of living   0.120** 0.014 
Retrospective economic evaluation   0.222** 0.016 
Education (ISCED levels)   0.044** 0.014 
     
N (respondents)  18,639  18,639 
N (systems)  26  26 
Var. (countries)  0.180  0.157 
Log-Likelihood  -20,419  -19,537 
AIC  40,884  39,129 
 
